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J ohn Maynard Keynes (1931) wrote in his essay “Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren”:
From the earliest times of which we have record—back, say, to two thousand 
years before Christ—down to the beginning of the eighteenth century, there 
was no very great change in the standard of life of the average man living in the 
civilised centres of the earth. Ups and downs certainly. Visitations of plague, 
famine, and war. Golden intervals. But no progressive, violent change. Some 
periods perhaps 50 per cent better than others—at the utmost 100 per cent 
better—in the four thousand years which ended (say) in A.D. 1700.
Over the decades, his nuanced account of the past has become a great deal more 
stylized—the lack of “very great” or “violent” change became an absence of any 
change. Today, received wisdom holds that the western European countries did not 
experience major phases of economic growth (or decline) prior to the Industrial 
Revolution. As one example among many that could be cited, Hansen and Prescott 
(2002, pp. 1214–15) write that “sustained growth has existed for at most the past 
two centuries, while the millennia prior have been characterized by stagnation with 
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no significant permanent growth in living standards.” Yet qualitative accounts of 
European histories seem to indicate that the Renaissance in Italy and the Golden 
Age in Holland reflected phases of economic development—associated with the 
expansion of trade and urbanization, as well as developments in art and science—
prior to the Industrial Revolution (Goldthwaite 2009; Acemoglu and Robinson 
2012; de Vries and van der Woude 1997).
Building in part on Angus Maddison’s (1982, 1995, 2003) bold empirical 
research program to create very long-run data series for many countries, a generation 
of economic historians has been exploring archives and combining datasets to create 
more and better evidence. Over the last four years, a number of very long-run time 
series have been completed for major economies of Europe connecting the late medi-
eval era with the present using annual data. The new time series have been looked at 
individually by the researchers who produced the data (Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, 
Overton, and van Leeuwen 2011; Malanima 2011; van Zanden and van Leeuwen 2012; 
Schön and Krantz 2012; Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 2013; Reis, Martins, 
and Costa 2013). The main aim of this paper is to present this data together and offer 
an alternative interpretation of very long-run European economic development.
The first section of this paper rejects the received wisdom that economies in 
pre–Industrial Revolution Europe were stagnant. The new data shows trends in GDP 
per capita in the key European economies before the Industrial Revolution, identi-
fying episodes of economic growth in specific countries, often lasting for decades. 
Ultimately, these periods of growth were not sustained, but they noticeably raised 
GDP per capita. It also shows that many of these economies experienced periods 
of substantial economic decline. Thus, rather than being stagnant, pre-nineteenth 
century European economies experienced a great deal of change.
In the second section, the paper tentatively finds that the likelihood of being in 
a phase of growth increased and the risk of being in a phase of decline decreased 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The discussion in the third section 
turns to evidence on patterns of divergence and convergence in Europe, showing 
that divergence occurred when a new economic leader moved ahead, followed by 
a period of convergence and catch-up by others. The fourth section presents the 
main data sources and methods used to construct the GDP per capita estimates 
from the late medieval and early modern eras until the nineteenth century in 
six European economies: England/Great Britain, Holland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, 
and Portugal.
Following the publication of successive editions of Maddison’s (1982, 1995, 
2003) data on long-run economic performance, understanding of long-run 
economic growth and development advanced, as many economists exploited the 
new information. Research by Baumol (1986), DeLong (1988), and Pritchett 
(1997) relating to convergence and divergence is based on Maddison’s post-1870 
OECD countries dataset, which helped to stimulate endogenous growth theory. 
Maddison’s work was also a key inspiration for new theories of economic growth: 
for instance, Maddison’s later dataset covering the entire world during the second 
millennium stimulated work by Hansen and Prescott (2002) and Galor (2005).
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The production of these new very long-run datasets may spur an equivalent or 
greater wave of understanding of economic growth and development. For the first 
time, it is possible to investigate annual changes in economic growth and devel-
opment over several centuries, potentially identifying multiple major phases of 
economic growth and decline in one or a series of countries. This more detailed 
perspective of very long-run European economic growth indicates that the Indus-
trial Revolution was not an isolated event originating in Great Britain. Instead, it 
was a phase in a much longer process of economic transformation across Europe.
Given current concerns about limited growth in industrialized economies and 
thoughts about ways to stimulate a new industrial revolution, research based on this 
data may offer insights about these underlying processes and be of great interest to 
economists in general. Since economic transformations on the scale of the Indus-
trial Revolution are rare events, an understanding of the processes underlying such 
transformations will need to look back many centuries. Furthermore, comparisons 
of past experiences with more recent ones may suggest commonalities in the rela-
tionships with and determinants of economic development. This paper focuses on 
presenting basic facts and patterns to the best of our current abilities, and avoids 
the temptation to seek more detailed explanations. However, recent work, work in 
progress, and future papers seem certain to employ this data as the basis for new 
empirical and theoretical research.
Growth Episodes and Growth Reversals in Europe before 1800
Economic growth before the nineteenth century was not stagnant, but had 
extended periods of growth and decline. Figure 1 presents GDP per capita for 
six European countries before the nineteenth century: England (from 1300 until 
1700) and Great Britain afterwards, Holland (starting in 1348), Italy (specifi-
cally, Central and Northern Italian States from 1310), Spain (since 1300), Sweden 
(beginning in 1560), and Portugal (from 1500).
Figure 1 depicts four major “growth episodes” in specific European economies. 
Of the economies shown, Italy was the first to have experienced a per capita growth 
episode as population declined sharply after the Black Death, leaving survivors with 
more land and capital per person. Moreover, it was a period in which Italian cities 
prospered by expanding their pivotal role in trade links between Europe and Asia 
(Hodgett 2006). Between 1350 and 1420, the level of per capita income rose by 
40 percent, which represents a modest but nonnegligible growth rate of 0.8 percent 
per year over 70 years.
Holland followed with a spectacular sixteenth century. Per capita GDP rose by 
70 percent from 1505 to 1595 as Dutch trade expanded rapidly and the economic 
structure shifted away from agricultural production towards higher-value commodi-
ties, which translates into a growth rate of 1.3 percent per annum during this period. 
A decade later, Sweden started developing through its control of the Baltic trade, 
and its per capita GDP grew 41 percent in the first half of the seventeenth century. 
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In the second half of the seventeenth century, England became the next vibrant 
economy—its per capita income growing by more than 50 percent during this time. 
This growth episode followed the end of a Civil War that marked an important step 
on the road to constitutional monarchy, culminating in the Glorious Revolution of 
1688 (North and Weingast 1989; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). However, popula-
tion stagnated during the second half of the seventeenth century, so it was only after 
1700 that Great Britain achieved modern economic growth with the coexistence of 
population growth and per capita GDP growth.
To ensure that these phases are not artifacts of selecting peaks and troughs 
in a volatile series, the total growth in GDP per capita is measured as the average 
value in the decade following the “growth episode” divided by the average value in 
the decade preceding this phase—although for reasons explained in greater detail 
later in this paper, one should be careful about over-interpreting these estimates. 
Some might argue that, starting from a low base, a rise of 40 or even 70 percent may 
not be a great absolute increase, and indeed, it is not very impressive when spread 
over 50 years or more. Nevertheless, these are unquestionably extended periods, 
Figure 1 
GDP per Capita in Selected European Economies, 1300–1800 
(three-year average; Spain eleven-year average)
Sources: England/Great Britain (Broadberry et al. 2011); Italy (Malanima 2011); Holland (van Zanden 
and van Leeuwen 2012); Sweden (Schön and Krantz 2012); Spain (Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la 
Escosura 2013); Portugal (Reis, Martins, and Costa 2013; Palma and Reis 2014).
Note: Figure 1 presents GDP per capita for six European countries before the nineteenth century: England 
(from 1300 until 1700) and Great Britain afterwards, Holland (starting in 1348), Italy (specifically, Central 
and Northern Italian States from 1310), Spain (since 1300), Sweden (beginning in 1560), and Portugal 
(from 1500).
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covering a number of decades, in which certain economies grew substantially in 
both relative and absolute terms, providing major improvements in the average 
standards of living (although ideally, distributional effects of these increases would 
also be taken into account). Clearly, these pre–nineteenth century European econ-
omies were not stagnant.
Interestingly, at practically every point during the entire sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries, at least one economy in Europe was experiencing a growth 
episode. It would be worth investigating in greater detail the scale of spillovers to 
trade partners and the degree of emulation in these early periods (Reinert 2011). 
Certainly, England was highly dependent on Swedish iron imports in the seven-
teenth century (King 2005) and sought to emulate Holland’s economic policies 
(Thirsk 1978). At the same time, until the eighteenth century, no two economies 
of the six shown here experienced simultaneous major phases of economic growth. 
While this certainly does not support the dubious mercantilist belief that foreign 
trade was a zero-sum game—and in particular, the belief that only exporters gained 
from international trade—it might help to explain why the belief held traction for 
so long (Smith 1776).
Figure 1 also identifies the periods that can be categorized as economic “growth 
reversals.” Italy suffered most from periods of major economic decline, from its 
early period of glory. It experienced three periods of substantial decline of around 
20 percent of per capita GDP as population growth returned, its markets remained 
fragmented between small states, and the focus of European trade shifted from 
the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. Following the collapse of per capita incomes in 
Italy in the mid-fifteenth century, it took more than 400 years to regain these levels 
of GDP per capita. Portugal suffered a dramatic collapse of roughly 40 percent of 
per  capita GDP in the first half of the sixteenth century, associated with poor 
weather conditions (Reis, Martins, and Costa 2013)—though it recovered partially 
in the subsequent two decades. The Spanish economy also declined from the end 
of the sixteenth century—which was associated with the resource curse resulting 
from silver mining in the colonies (Drelichman 2005; Álvarez-Nogal and Prados 
de la Escosura 2013). Sweden suffered a collapse in the early eighteenth century, 
as it lost its great power status, with per capita GDP dropping almost 30 percent in 
three decades. Finally, after a period of growth in the first half of the eighteenth 
century, Portugal lost 16 percent of per capita GDP in three years and then spiraled 
downwards following the Great Earthquake of Lisbon in 1755.
There is little understanding of major economic collapses, especially since 
they are such rare events. In Anna Karenina, Leo Tolstoy proposes that “[a]ll happy 
families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” Certainly, there 
has been plenty of effort put toward finding in what way successful economies are 
alike, but little toward understanding the ways in which unsuccessful economies 
decline. More analyses of economic declines are needed to complement studies of 
economic failure such as Easterly and Levine (1997), Rodrik (1999), and Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2012). These new long-run datasets hold the promise of shedding 
light on economically depressed phases in history.
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The Long Road to Sustained Growth
Each of the six European economies discussed here experienced phases of 
economic growth and decline at different times. Despite the different national 
patterns, did a general change in growth rates occur over time? In particular, one 
might provisionally expect that there were more phases of growth and fewer phases 
of economic decline in later centuries.
In looking at Figure 1, few obvious differences between centuries emerge. The 
seventeenth and eighteenth century perhaps show greater growth, but they also have 
more and better data. Many different criteria have been proposed for identifying 
phases of growth more formally, such as the frequency of consecutive years of growth 
(Hausman, Pritchett, and Rodrik 2005; Easterly 2006). However, identifying phases of 
growth is more difficult when analyzing mostly agrarian economies or periods before 
reliable statistical records existed, because of the high volatility in the GDP per capita 
series. The volatility can result either from weather-sensitive agricultural production 
or the estimation methods, which inevitably display a great degree of uncertainty.
Not surprisingly, therefore, a more formal analysis does not identify any 
difference over these earlier centuries: for example, in each century before 1800, 
there was only a 1–2 percent chance of a country being in a period of more than 
1.5 percent annual growth in four consecutive years, as shown in Table 1, column 2. 
For comparison, this likelihood increased to a 5 percent chance in the nine-
teenth century and a 40 percent likelihood during the twentieth century. So, for 
the six countries observed, there was a substantial difference in the likelihood of 
sustained periods of growth between the pre-1800 period and the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. As received wisdom suggests, sustained economic growth seems 
to be a more recent phenomenon.
Looking at the economic downturns, Figure 1 does not seem to display an 
obvious change in frequencies before 1800. However, Table 1 provides some evidence. 
Here, we use a criterion of three consecutive years of less than −1.5 percent growth 
to identify a downturn. Adding across the six countries, there were 47 downturns 
before the nineteenth century and only eight after 1800. Between the fifteenth and 
eighteenth century, there was an average of two economic downturns per country 
per century (10 + 14 + 9 + 12 episodes divided by six countries divided by four 
centuries), while the nineteenth and twentieth centuries experienced less than one 
economic downturn per country per century. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centu-
ries, economic downturns occurred about 8 percent of the time; in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, they were experienced 4–5 percent of years; and, in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, downturns occurred 2–3 percent of the time. 
Thus, there appears to have been a modest reduction in the likelihood of experi-
encing downturns over the centuries from the fifteenth century.
Of course, caution should be taken in interpreting these values. While, the nine 
four-year stretches of pre-1800 economic growth in any of the six economies (see 
column 1 of Table 1) do coincide with broadly agreed-upon periods of economic 
improvements; the method used here to identify four-year-phases of growth could 
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easily include periods in which the economy did not improve or exclude periods in 
which the economy did improve.
However, this evidence tentatively indicates that, before the nineteenth century, 
there was little apparent difference in growth phases and a possible reduction in 
the frequency of downturns. By comparing the data with the last two centuries, 
there do appear to be substantial increases in growth phases and reductions in the 
occurrence of downturns in the nineteenth and especially the twentieth centuries. 
Explaining the source of these differences could prove to be important for under-
standing how economies managed to generate sustained economic growth.
Very Long-Run Cycles of Convergence and Divergence
The convergence and divergence of GDP per capita in the very long run is a 
central question in the literature on economic development. For example, the classic 
Solow (1956) growth model predicts convergence of less-developed economies with 
leading economies (for discussion, see Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992; see also in 
this journal the Lucas, 2000, model of convergence driven by the “take-off” date). 
While some economies have caught up since the end of the nineteenth century, many 
have remained less developed and fallen behind relative to the leading economies 
Table 1  
Periods of Economic Growth and Decline across Six Economies, 
1300–2000 
(England/Great Britain, Italy, Holland, Sweden, Spain, and Portugal) 
# of phases of  
4-year consecutive  
1.5% annual  
growth rate
% of years in 
4-year consecutive  
1.5% annual  
growth rate
# of phases of  
3-year consecutive  
−1.5% annual  
growth rate
% of years in  
3-year consecutive 
−1.5% annual  
growth rate
1300s 1 1.1% 2 1.6%
1400s 1 1.0% 10 8.0%
1500s 3 2.3% 14 8.7%
1600s 2 1.3% 9 4.3%
1700s 2 1.3% 12 5.8%
1800s 8 5.3% 4 2.0%
1900s 38 40.0% 4 3.2%
Source: Authors.
Notes: Column 1 represents the number of times countries in the group had four 
consecutive years of at least 1.5 percent growth in GDP per capita. That is, if this 
were to happen once in one country and twice in another country within a certain 
century, it would equal three times in that century. Column 2 shows the same 
as a percentage of the total number of years (for which data exists) during the 
specified century. Column 3 represents the number of times a country had three 
consecutive years of −1.5 percent (or lower) growth rates. Column 4 shows the 
same as column 3 as a percentage of total number of years.
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(Easterlin 1981; Abramovitz 1986; Pritchett 1997). From a very long-run perspective, 
there has been a great deal of debate about the Great Divergence, when European 
economies overtook Asian economies like China over the period from the sixteenth 
to the nineteenth century (Pomeranz 2000; Broadberry and Gupta 2006; Allen, 
Bassino, Ma, Moll-Murata, and van Zanden 2011; Broadberry 2013). What does the 
very long-run data presented here have to say about the process of convergence?
With evidence for only a small sample of economies around the world, drawing 
conclusions about very long-run divergence and convergence at a global scale is 
inappropriate—in fact, DeLong (1988) showed that often the countries for which 
historical data exist are the successful economies with high GDP per capita and, 
therefore, drawing global conclusions based on a historical sub-sample can be 
very misleading. Thus, it is important to emphasize that the focus in the following 
discussion is on regional European convergence or divergence. Amongst these six 
European economies, data availability does not reflect relative success, as there was 
considerable catching-up and falling behind of particular nations over this 500-year 
period. Thus, at least tentative conclusions about convergence and divergence for 
European economies may be drawn from the data available.
A “Little Divergence” between Mediterranean and Northwest European econ-
omies has been proposed using some of these new datasets. Broadberry (2013) 
focuses on explaining the Great Divergence between Europe and Asia and the Little 
Divergence between northwestern Europe and the rest of Europe from the sixteenth 
century, arguing that economic structure and institutions determined how particular 
economies reacted to and were affected by the pivotal shocks (or “critical junctures” in 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) associated with the Black Death in the mid-fourteenth 
century and the new trade routes between Europe, Asia, and the Americas that 
opened-up at the end of the fifteenth century. Thus, to some, the shocks were curses; 
to others, they were blessings in the long run.
However, some additional observations related to convergence and diver-
gence across these countries are also possible. By comparing the position of the 
leading economy’s GDP per capita relative to that of the “following economies,” it 
is possible to discern from Figure 1 the degree of convergence. Using a very limited 
set of countries (England, Holland, Italy, and Spain), we see that for much of the 
fourteenth and fifteenth century, the average economy in Europe had a GDP per 
capita of between 50 and 60 percent of the leading economy, Italy. For a slightly 
broader set of countries, we see that by 1500, the average economy was 75 percent of 
the leading economy.1 By 1600, when Holland had emerged as the new leader, the 
average economy had fallen to 42 percent of the leader. By 1700, with Holland stag-
nating and England catching up, this average was 61 percent of the leader. By 1800, 
with the Industrial Revolution and Great Britain’s supremacy, the gap increased and 
1 For this calculation and subsequent calculations in this paragraph, we also include German states 
(Pfister 2011), France (Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 2013; see also Squicciarini and 
Voigtländer forthcoming) and what would today be known as Belgium (Buyst 2011), for which new data 
for each century are available.
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the average was 50 percent of the leader. By 1900, for these average European coun-
tries, per capita GDP had fallen to 41 percent of the leader (Bolt and van Zanden 
2014). In 2000, as other studies have shown (Baumol 1986; Pritchett 1997), the 
gap had once again dropped amongst these European countries, and the relative 
average was 84 percent of the leader, the Netherlands.
Thus, amongst the group of economies in Figure 1 and a slightly broader set of 
countries (and extending the evidence to the present), there appear to be cycles 
of divergence (in the fourteenth, sixteenth, and eighteenth centuries) and conver-
gence (in the fifteenth, seventeenth, and twentieth centuries) over the very long run. 
These very long-run cycles of economic divergence and convergence are linked with 
the emergence of new leaders, the waning of their momentum, and the catching-up 
by followers. The fourteenth century was probably the beginning of a phase of diver-
gence associated with the rise of Central and Northern Italy. By 1600, Holland was 
the new leading economy and the (average) relative level of followers had declined, 
suggesting divergence (Broadberry 2013). In 1800, England was catching up with 
Holland and taking the lead shortly afterwards; thus, divergence occurred in the 
eighteenth century and was accentuated during the nineteenth century. Phases of 
convergence reflected the stagnation (or even decline) of the leader and the process 
of other economies learning from the leader and perhaps gaining from spillovers.
Finally, building on Quah’s (1996, 1997) concept of income mobility, it is 
worth commenting on the ability of economies to move upwards relative to other 
followers, though not necessarily to become the leader. Figure 1 shows that there 
was some mobility and opportunity for economies in Europe to improve their posi-
tions and status, which may have been important in determining the outcome of 
geopolitical tensions amongst European rivals. However, it also shows that there was 
a tendency for the leader to remain in its position as the wealthiest economy for a 
century or more, and for the poorest to be stuck for very long periods. Thus, within 
Europe there was a degree of stratification and the formation of clubs, with some 
mobility between them (as argued in Durlauf and Johnson 1995).
The Data
How can researchers construct these GDP per capita estimates from the 
late medieval and early modern eras until the nineteenth century? As discussed 
earlier, Figure 1 presents six original datasets constructed within the last four years: 
England/Great Britain, Holland, Northern and Central Italy, Spain, Sweden, and 
Portugal. Each time series starts and ends in different years and uses a different 
combination of methods to estimate output. Table 2 summarizes the sources and 
methods of data construction for agricultural and nonagricultural sectors.
Three main methods have been used to construct historical estimates of GDP 
and GDP per capita: methods based on direct measures of income, methods based 
on direct measures of output, and indirect methods. The first method involves 
estimating national income from data on individual incomes or, more commonly, 
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wages—particularly by Clark (2007, 2010). However, when using wages, this 
approach needs to take account of changes in hours per day worked and days per 
year worked—or else, it offers only limited evidence on variation in living standards 
through time. Without taking account of all factors, GDP estimates based on income 
and output approaches are likely to follow divergent trends over time. Angeles 
(2008) identifies three key factors determining the divergence: income distribu-
tion, per capita labor supply, and relative price changes. He shows that there was 
considerable divergence in English GDP per capita and real wages between 1700 
and 1820 due to increased inequality (Saito 2015), the “Industrious Revolution” 
(a term used to convey that the Industrial Revolution was a longer-run combination 
of events than is often considered, as in de Vries 1994), and the increasing relative 
price of food (Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton, and van Leeuwen 2015).
Given these concerns about using income or wage-based approaches, either the 
output method or indirect methods (focusing on demand or using proxies), were 
used to create the six time series presented in Figure 1 and Table 1. Here, some 
examples will illustrate how GDP estimates were generated using these methods.
The generally preferred approach to estimating national income is the output 
approach, provided sufficient information is available on the main sources of produc-
tion (de Vries and van der Woude 1997, p. 721; Maddison 2007, pp. 316–19; Broadberry 
et al. 2011, p. 2). The rich accounts of English and British economic history since late 
medieval times offered an opportunity to estimate pre-1870 annual GDP using an 
output approach that separates the agricultural, industrial, and service sectors.
England/Great Britain
For medieval agriculture, three data sources are available: first, the Medieval 
Accounts Database of Campbell (2000, 2007) is based mainly on a large sample of 
Table 2 
A Broad Classification of Methods for Estimating GDP per Capita in 
Selected European Countries
Period Agriculture Industry Service
England/Great Britain 1270–1870 Output Output Output/Proxies 
Holland 1348–1510 
1510–1807
Demand 
Output
Proxies 
Output
Proxies 
Output
Italy (Central &  
 Northern Regions)
1310–1861 Demand Proxies Proxies
Spain 1254–1850 Demand Proxies Proxies
Sweden 1560–1800 Demand Output Proxies
Portugal 1500–1850 Demand Proxies Proxies
Sources: England/Great Britain (Broadberry et al. 2011); Italy (Malanima 2011); 
Holland (van Zanden and van Leeuwen 2012); Sweden (Schön and Krantz 2012); Spain 
(Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 2013); Portugal (Reis, Martins, and Costa 
2013; Palma and Reis 2014).
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manorial accounts, which were drawn up using a common template by the reeve 
(a  servant of the lord), who managed the demesne (the land owned by the lord) 
under close supervision of the lord’s bailiff or steward and recorded detailed informa-
tion on land use, crops, animals, and livestock products. Second, the Early Modern 
Probate Inventories Database covering the mid-sixteenth to the mid-eighteenth 
centuries, assembled by Overton (1991; 2000) and Overton, Whittle, Dean, and Haan 
(2004), pulls together similar information extracted from inventories drawn up by the 
Church Commissioners for the estates of farmers. Third, the Modern Farm Accounts 
Database of Turner, Beckett, and Afton (2001), covering a period from 1720 until 
1913, is based on a large sample of accounts produced by farmers and kept in local 
record offices. Agricultural outputs were calculated by multiplying the acreage for 
each crop by the yield per acre. Broadberry et al. (2015) estimate the total acreage. 
The trends in yields were split into three main time periods, based on the data sources 
available. For pastoral output, a similar procedure was undertaken, multiplying the 
number of animals by the share producing and their yields. Prices for individual crops 
and animal products are used to convert the output into current prices and create 
weights for the agricultural real output index.
Production estimates or indicators existed for the key English industries up 
to 1700, based on careful reconstruction from archival records by generations of 
scholars. Crucial sources included Carus-Wilson and Coleman (1963) for wool and 
woolen cloth, drawing on detailed records of exports of wool and woolen cloth; King 
(2005) for iron, based on a reconstruction of all blast furnaces, their capacity, and 
knowledge of when they were in blast; and Hatcher (1973) for tin, based on receipts 
of coinage dues. Outputs related to leather and food processing were estimated by 
Broadberry et al. (2015) on the basis of key inputs obtained from the reconstruc-
tion of the agricultural sector. For the construction sector, detailed information on 
cathedral building is combined with an index of housebuilding based on population 
and urbanization, while the growth of book production is based on titles listed by the 
British Library. These series are combined to generate an index of industrial produc-
tion from 1264 to 1700. Crafts and Harley (1992) offer an index from 1700 until 1870, 
to which Broadberry et al. (2015) add some new series.
For the service sector, an approach developed by Deane and Cole (1962), was 
followed with some adjustments. The service sector is broken down into commerce, 
housing, domestic services, and government. The commerce indicator is based on 
combining estimates of domestic trade (the volume of agricultural and industrial 
output adjusted for the growing share that was marketed) and international trade 
(derived from the detailed records of trade that were kept for taxation purposes), 
freight transport (based on merchant shipping tonnage, distances traveled on the 
main trade routes, and volumes shipped), and financial services (using the velocity 
of money, derived by comparing estimates of the stock of money with existing esti-
mates of nominal, as opposed to real, national income). Housing and domestic 
services were assumed to grow at the same rate as population. Government activity is 
measured based on its revenue, which exists in detailed annual exchequer accounts 
back to the early twelfth century (O’Brien and Hunt 1999).
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The three real output series for the agricultural, industrial, and service sectors 
were combined using a set of sectoral weights that capture the changing structure 
of the economy. The starting point is an input-output table for 1841 from Horrell, 
Humphries, and Weale (1994). The nominal value-added shares for 1841 are 
projected back using the sectoral real output series reflated to convert them into 
nominal series. The principal sources for the price series used include Clark (2004, 
2005, 2006), Beveridge (1939), and Thorold Rogers (1866–1902). Value-added shares 
for each sector are derived in this way at roughly 50-year intervals and used to create 
a chained index of GDP, following Feinstein (1972). To estimate GDP per capita, 
this aggregate GDP series is divided by population, taken from Wrigley and Schofield 
(1989) and Wrigley, Davies, Oeppen, and Schofield (1997) for the period since 1541, 
and derived from information on the number of tenants in a regionally representative 
sample of manors using the method of Hallam (1988) for the pre-1541 period.
Italy
The indirect approach to estimating GDP per capita depends on modeling 
or using proxies to generate indicators of economic output. Particularly for agri-
cultural production, where demand is deemed to be relatively stable, a model of 
agricultural demand is used. For example, the lack of evidence on agricultural 
production in Italy prior to the mid-nineteenth century led Malanima (2011) to use 
the demand approach. Estimates of agricultural production start with the assump-
tion that they are equal to consumption. While there might be some imports and 
exports, Malanima (2011) argues that the net value of these imports and exports are 
negligible for Central and Northern Italy. Thus, estimates of agricultural consump-
tion will provide a close indicator of production.
The exercise for Italy involved estimating per capita agricultural consumption 
based on a model of demand (including income and price elasticities) and data 
on consumer income levels and real prices of agricultural production and indus-
trial products (as substitutes). A number of other historical studies, pioneered by 
Crafts (1980) and more recently developed by Allen (2000), have used estimates 
of income elasticities of agricultural products ranging from 0.3 to 0.9. Guided by 
these previous studies, and Italian estimates from 1861 to 1910 (Federico 2003), 
Malanima (2011) selected an income elasticity of 0.4. The previous historical studies 
reviewed had used a cross-price elasticity of 0.1—in other words, agricultural and 
industrial products are seen as weak substitutes for one another. The sum of the 
income, own-price, and cross-price elasticities are assumed equal to 0 (relying on 
the “adding-up” property in linear models described in Deaton and Muellbauer 
1980, p. 16), which helps to guide the value of the own-price elasticity (−0.5). Thus, 
based on these elasticities, and on data for wages (acting as a proxy for income) 
and for the real prices of agricultural and nonagricultural products, Malanima 
(2011) estimated the per capita agricultural consumption and, hence, an indicator 
of production. Price and wage data were collected systematically from institutions 
such as schools, hospitals, and government departments for many European coun-
tries reaching back to the medieval period.
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For industry and service sectors, indirect production estimates often depend 
on long-run trends in urbanization rates, and Bairoch’s (1988) dataset of European 
towns greater than 5,000 inhabitants going back 1,000 years is crucial for this 
approach. Urbanization rates offer an indicator of the share of nonagricultural 
activities, as town and city dwellers are not likely to be involved in crop cultivation 
or pastoral activities. Naturally, an indirect approach is generally only used when 
the direct approaches using output or income are not possible due to a lack of data. 
However, given the lack of detailed income and output data, indirect methods are 
starting to be used more in this area of research.
For Central and Northern Italy, the share of nonagricultural output between 
1861 and 1936 was regressed on urbanization rates. The coefficient of the relation-
ship was key to estimating output before 1861. However, without taking account of 
non-urban industry over the centuries, there would have been a risk of overestimating 
late medieval output. Thus, combining the coefficient and the urbanization rates 
with an index of the share of non-urban workers (based on Allen 2000), the share of 
nonagricultural output was estimated back to 1310. With an estimate of per capita agri-
cultural output and of the share of nonagricultural output, it was possible to construct 
a GDP per capita series from 1310 until 1861. For consistency, this series was linked 
to a series for Central and Northern Italy (Daniele and Malanima 2007). While Bolt 
and van Zanden (2014, p. 635) raise some questions about these estimate, this series 
provides a valuable (and the only) indicator of long-run growth rates related to Italy.
Putting these various estimates together with an estimate of per capita agricul-
tural output and of the share of nonagricultural output (sometimes separated into 
industrial and service sectors), it is possible to construct a GDP series. This value is 
then divided by the geographical boundary’s population to produce per capita GDP. 
General Considerations
As one might expect, there is considerable uncertainty about the margins of 
error surrounding the estimates of per capita GDP given here. Readers seeking a 
guide can begin by considering the methodologies used. For instance, van Zanden 
and van Leeuwen (2012) propose that the data for Holland before 1510 is far less 
reliable than the data for Holland between 1510 and 1807 because the former was 
based on modeling agricultural demand and proxies for industry and services, 
whereas the latter was based on output measures. Thus, data based on output 
measures, such as those for England/Great Britain, Holland from 1510, and to a 
lesser extent Sweden, are likely to be more accurate.
Of course, the brief description offered here is a gross simplification of the 
complexities involved in the truly mammoth task of estimating historical GDP 
per capita. Generating these estimates includes identifying and pulling together 
hundreds of data sources and deciding upon historically justifiable assumptions. 
Great care must be taken in ensuring that prices and baskets of goods are compa-
rable and benchmarked over time (Prados de la Escosura 2000, 2015).
For greater detail, the reader is encouraged to consult the original papers for 
each country: England/Great Britain (Broadberry et al. 2011, 2015); Italy (Malanima 
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2011); Holland (van Zanden and van Leeuwen 2012); Sweden (Schön and Krantz 
2012); Spain (Alvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 2013); and Portugal (Reis, 
Martins, and Costa 2013; Palma and Reis 2014). Data for these countries (and 
many others) from the nineteenth century to the present are much better known, 
and information about how they were constructed can be found in a number of 
sources—probably the most updated discussion of these sources, associated with the 
Maddison Project, is Bolt and van Zanden (2014).
Conclusion
While the data presented here have notable limitations, they offer the first 
detailed picture of economic development in Western Europe for the 500 years before 
the Industrial Revolution. Clearly, the received wisdom that preindustrial econo-
mies more than two centuries ago were stagnant is not true. These economies had 
major and minor phases of economic growth before the nineteenth century, some 
lasting more than 50 years, which often led to substantial long-run improvements in 
per capita income—even if these growth rates were not ultimately sustained.
Subsequent research in this area will continue to check and re-estimate the 
very long-run data on per capita GDP for these economies and others. However, it 
will also move on to the challenges of explaining the patterns in the data theoreti-
cally and econometrically. For example, it will be useful to consider the pre-1800 
growth episodes and reversals in European economies, changes in the likelihood of 
phases of growth and of decline over time, and periods and cycles of divergence and 
convergence. In addition to GDP per capita, there are more very long-run data avail-
able on a number of traditional explanatory variables, such as institutions, human 
capital, and population changes, as well as shocks like plagues and wars.
Although research using this very long-run data is still in its early stages, it is 
already offering some insight and challenges for how we think about the processes of 
economic growth. For example, an economy in which per capita income stagnated 
for 500 years would have been very different from the preindustrial European econo-
mies that experienced multiple peaks and troughs. Each substantial peak and trough 
in per capita income implied a process of change—of new technologies, institutions, 
beliefs, and behavior. Each step in history sets the stage for the next step. Thus, the six 
preindustrial European economies studied here were changing, with agents adjusting 
to new incentives and constraints and in some ways adopting a substantially new 
economic system roughly every 50 to 100 years. It seems very possible (even probable) 
that economies in other regions of the world experienced major peaks and troughs—
as China did in the eleventh century (Broadberry, Guan, and Li 2014). However, the 
dynamism of the rises and falls in European economies from the fourteenth century 
may offer a clue to the Great Divergence between Europe and China during this time 
period (Broadberry 2013), which suggests a possible avenue of future research.
Preindustrial Europe also showed patterns of divergence and convergence. 
Divergence was associated with a new leading economy. Convergence was associated 
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with phases of economic stagnation or decline amongst leading economies. World 
economic leaders at one time often seem to struggle to grow beyond a certain 
range of economic development: for example, this described China in the elev-
enth century, Italy in the fifteenth century, Holland in the eighteenth century, and 
even England in the late nineteenth century. In time, a few economies converged 
on the leader and then, when these catch-up economies developed new technolo-
gies and institutions, one of them overtook the leader. It is intriguing to speculate 
as to whether England, the world leader in per capita GDP in the late nineteenth 
century, might have stagnated had other economies—like the United States and 
later Germany—not overtaken it and had England been unable to import new tech-
nologies, modes of management, and institutions.
The very long-run historical evidence presented here resolves what had previ-
ously appeared to be a major difference between recent developing economy growth 
patterns and the received wisdom on preindustrial patterns. Received wisdom held 
that European countries at low levels of economic development before the Indus-
trial Revolution were stagnant. However, empirical studies of developing economies 
during the last century or so have indicated that GDP per capita has tended to 
be characterized by spurts of high growth, with periods of stagnation and decline, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa (Easterly and Levine 1997; Pritchett 2000; Durlauf, 
Johnson, and Temple 2006; Easterly 2006; Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin 2014). The 
findings here suggest that historical patterns of economic growth and decline in 
preindustrial Europe may have been broadly similar to those of present-day devel-
oping economies—another area of ongoing and future research.
Finally, many contending theoretical explanations for past GDP per capita 
start from the assumption of stagnant economies followed by an economic take-off. 
Such theories need adjustment to take account of the new evidence. For all of these 
questions, and many others, the next few years promise exciting advances in our 
understanding of very long-run economic growth.
■ We would like to thank Simon Dietz, Baran Doda, Gordon Hanson, Ralph Hippe, 
Alexander Klein, Enrico Moretti, Suresh Naidu, Leandro Prados de la Escosura, Debraj 
Ray, Martin Stuermer, Timothy Taylor, and John van Reenen, as well as participants 
at the AEA annual meeting, for discussions related to this paper, and Bas van Leeuwen, 
Leandro Prados de la Escosura, Nuno Palma, Jaime Reis, and Nico Voigtländer for their 
data. Support for this project from the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), and the ESRC 
is gratefully acknowledged.
References
Abramovitz, Moses. 1986. “Catching Up, 
Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind.” Journal of 
Economic History 46(2): 385–406.
Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson. 2012. 
Why Nations Fail? The Origins of Power, Prosperity, 
and Poverty. Crown Publishers.
242     Journal of Economic Perspectives
Allen, Robert C. 2000. “Economic Structure and 
Agricultural Productivity in Europe, 1300–1800.” 
European Review of Economic History 4(1): 1–26.
Allen, Robert C., Jean‐Pascal Bassino, Debin 
Ma, Christine Moll‐Murata, and Jan Luiten van 
Zanden. 2011. “Wages, Prices, and Living Stan-
dards in China, 1738–1925: In Comparison with 
Europe, Japan, and India.” Economic History Review 
64(s1): 8–38.
Álvarez-Nogal, Carlos, and Leandro Prados 
de la Escosura. 2013. “The Rise and Fall of Spain 
(1270–1850).” Economic History Review 66(1): 1–37.
Angeles, Luis. 2008. “GDP per Capita or Real 
Wages? Making Sense of Conflicting Views on 
Pre-industrial Europe.” Explorations in Economic 
History 45(2): 147–63.
Bairoch, Paul. 1988. Cities and Economic 
Development: From the Dawn of History to the Present. 
University of Chicago Press.
Baumol, William J. 1986. “Productivity Growth, 
Convergence and Welfare: What the Long-Run 
Data Show.” American Economic Review 76(5): 
1072–85.
Beveridge, William. 1939. Prices and Wages in 
England from the Twelfth to the Nineteenth Century, Vol. I: 
Price Tables: Mercantile Era. London: Longmans, 
Green.
Bolt, Jutte, and Jan Luiten van Zanden. 2014. 
“The Maddison Project: Collaborative Research 
on Historical National Accounts.” Economic History 
Review 67(3): 627–51.
Broadberry, Stephen. 2013. “Accounting for 
the Great Divergence.” Economic History Working 
Paper 184/13, London School of Economics 
and Political Science, Department of Economic 
History.
Broadberry, Stephen, Bruce Campbell, Alex-
ander Klein, Mark Overton, and Bas van Leeuwen. 
2011. “British Economic Growth, 1270–1870: An 
Output-Based Approach.” Available at: http://
www2.lse.ac.uk/economicHistory/whosWho/
profiles/sbroadberry.aspx.
Broadberry, Stephen, Bruce Campbell, 
Alexander Klein, Mark Overton, and Bas 
van Leeuwen. 2015. British Economic Growth, 
1270–1870. Cambridge University Press.
Broadberry, Stephen, Hanhui Guan, and 
David Daokui Li. 2014. “China, Europe and the 
Great Divergence: A Study in Historical National 
Accounting, 980–1850.” Economic History Depart-
ment Paper, London School of Economics.
Broadberry, Stephen, and Bishnupriya Gupta. 
2006. “The Early Modern Great Divergence: 
Wages, Prices and Economic Development in 
Europe and Asia, 1500–1800.” Economic History 
Review 59(1): 2–31.
Buyst, Eric. 2011. “Towards Estimates of Long 
Term Growth in the Southern Low Countries, 
ca.1500–1846.” Paper for the “Quantifying Long 
Run Economic Development” conference at the 
University of Warwick in Venice, March 22–24. 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/
events/seminars-workshops-conferences/
conferences/venice3/programme/buyst.pdf.
Campbell, Bruce M. S. 2000. English Seigniorial 
Agriculture, 1250–1450. Cambridge University Press.
Campbell, Bruce M. S. 2007. Three Centuries of 
English Crop Yields, 1211–1491. A database. http://
www.cropyields.ac.uk.
Carus-Wilson, Eleanora M., and Olive Coleman. 
1963. England’s Export Trade, 1275–1547. Oxford 
University Press.
Clark, Gregory. 2004. “The Price History of 
English Agriculture, 1209–1914.” In Research in 
Economic History, vol. 22, edited by Susan Wolcott 
and Christopher Hanes, 41–125. Emerald Group 
Publishing.
Clark, Gregory. 2005. “The Condition of the 
Working Class in England, 1209–2004.” Journal of 
Political Economy 113(6): 1307–40.
Clark, Gregory. 2006. “England, Prices and Wages 
since 13th [Century].” Global Price and Income 
History Group, University of California, Davis. Avail-
able at: http://gpih.ucdavis.edu/Datafilelist.htm.
Clark, Gregory. 2007. “The Long March of 
History: Farm Wages, Population, and Economic 
Growth, England 1209–1869.” Economic History 
Review 60(1): 97–135.
Clark, Gregory. 2010. “The Macroeconomic 
Aggregates for England, 1209–2008.” In Research in 
Economic History vol. 27, edited by Susan Wolcott 
and Christopher Hanes, 51–140. Emerald Group 
Publishing.
Crafts, Nicholas F. R. 1980. “Income Elasticities 
of Demand and the Release of Labour by Agri-
culture during the British Industrial Revolution.” 
Journal of European Economic History 9(1): 153–68.
Crafts, Nicholas F. R., and C. Knick Harley. 
1992. “Output Growth and the Industrial Revolu-
tion: A Restatement of the Crafts-Harley View.” 
Economic History Review 45(4): 703–30.
Daniele, Vittorio, and Paolo Malanima. 2007. 
“Il prodotto delle regioni e il divario Nord-Sud in 
Italia (1861–2004).” Rivista di Politica Economica 
97(2): 267–316.
Deane, Phyllis, and William A. Cole. 1962. 
British Economic Growth 1688–1959. Cambridge 
University Press.
Deaton, Angus, and John Muellbauer. 1980. 
Economics and Consumer Behaviour. Cambridge 
University Press.
DeLong, J. Bradford. 1988. “Productivity 
Growth, Convergence, and Welfare: Comment.” 
American Economic Review 78(5): 1138–54.
Seven Centuries of European Economic Growth and Decline     243
de Vries, Jan. 1994. “The Industrial Revolu-
tion and the Industrious Revolution.” Journal of 
Economic History 54(2): 249–70.
de Vries, Jan, and Ad van der Woude. 1997. 
“The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure and 
Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1815.” 
Cambridge University Press.
Drelichman, Mauricio. 2005. “The Curse of 
Moctezuma: American Silver and the Dutch 
Disease.” Explorations in Economic History 42(3): 
349–80.
Durlauf, Steven N., and Paul A. Johnson. 1995. 
“Multiple Regimes and Cross-Country Growth 
Behaviour.” Journal of Applied Econometrics 10(4): 
365–84.
Durlauf, Steven N., Paul A. Johnson, and Jona-
than R. W. Temple. 2006. “Growth Econometrics.” 
In Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol. 1, edited by 
P. Aghion, and S. N. Durlauf, 555–677. Elsevier.
Easterlin, Richard. 1981. “Why Isn’t the Whole 
World Developed.” Journal of Economic History 
41(1): 1–19.
Easterly, William. 2006. “Reliving the 50s: The 
Big Push, Poverty Traps, and Takeoffs in Economic 
Development.” Journal of Economic Growth 11(4): 
289–318.
Easterly, William, and Ross Levine. 1997. “Africa’s 
Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(4): 1203–50. 
Federico, Giovanni. 2003. “Le nuove stime della 
produzione agricola italiana, 1860–1910: Primi 
risultati e implicazioni.” Rivista di Storia Economica, 
issue 3, pp. 359–82.
Feinstein, Charles H. 1972. National Income, 
Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom, 
1855–1965. Cambridge University Press.
Galor, Oded. 2005. “From Stagnation to Growth: 
Unified Growth Theory.” In Handbook of Economic 
Growth, Vol. 1A, edited by P. Aghion and S. N. 
Durlauf, 171–293. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Goldthwaite, Richard A. 2009. The Economy of 
Renaissance Florence. Johns Hopkins University 
Press.
Hallam, Henry E. 1988. “Population Move-
ments in England, 1086–1350.” In The Agrarian 
History of England and Wales, Vol. 2: 1042–1350, 
edited by H. E. Hallam, pp. 508–93. Cambridge 
University Press.
Hansen, Gary D., and Edward C. Prescott. 2002. 
“Malthus to Solow.” American Economic Review 
92(5): 1205–17.
Hatcher, John. 1973. English Tin Production and 
Trade before 1550. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hausmann, Ricardo, Lant Pritchett, and Dani 
Rodrik. 2005. “Growth Accelerations.” Journal of 
Economic Growth 10(4): 303–29.
Hodgett, Gerald A. J. 1972 [2006]. A Social 
and Economic History of Medieval Europe. London: 
Methuen. (2006 edition published by Routledge).
Horrell, Sara, Jane Humphries, and Martin 
Weale. 1994. “An Input-Output Table for 1841.” 
Economic History Review 47(3): 545–66.
Keynes, John Maynard. 1931. “Economic 
Possibilities for Our Grandchildren.” In Essays 
in Persuasion, by John Maynard Keynes. London: 
Macmillan.
King, Peter. 2005. “The Production and 
Consumption of Bar Iron in Early Modern England 
and Wales.” Economic History Review 58(1): 1–33.
Lucas, Robert E. 2000. “Some Macroeconomics 
for the 21st Century.” Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives 14(1): 159–68.
Maddison, Angus. 1982. Phases of Capitalist 
Development; Booms, Crises, and Globalizations. 
Oxford University Press.
Maddison, Angus. 1995. Monitoring the World 
Economy, 1820–1992. OECD Development Center.
Maddison, Angus. 2003. The World Economy: 
Historical Statistics. OECD.
Maddison, Angus. 2007. Contours of the World 
Economy 1–2030 AD: Essays in Macro-Economic 
History. Oxford University Press.
Malanima, Paolo. 2011. “The Long Decline of a 
Leading Economy: GDP in Central and Northern 
Italy, 1300–1913.” European Review of Economic 
History 15(2): 169–219.
Mankiw, N. Greg, David Romer, and David N. 
Weil. 1992. “A Contribution to the Empirics of 
Economic Growth.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
107(2): 407–37.
North, Douglas C., and Barry R. Weingast. 
1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolu-
tion of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 
Seventeenth-Century England.” Journal of Economic 
History 49(4): 803–32.
O’Brien, Patrick K., and Philip A. Hunt. 1999. 
“England, 1485–1815.” In The Rise of the Fiscal 
State in Europe, c.1200–1850, edited by R. Bonney, 
pp. 53–100. Oxford University Press.
Overton, Mark. 1991. “The Determinants 
of Crop Yields in Early Modern England.” In 
Land, Labour and Livestock: Historical Studies in 
European Agricultural Productivity, edited by B. M. S. 
Campbell and M. Overton, 284–322. Manchester 
University Press.
Overton, Mark. 2000. “Prices from Probate 
Inventories.” In When Death Do Us Part: Under-
standing and Interpreting the Probate Records of Early 
Modern England, edited by T. Arkell, N. Evans, and 
N. Goose, 120–43. Oxford: Leopard’s Head Press.
Overton, Mark, Jane Whittle, Darron Dean, 
and Andrew Hann. 2004. Production and Consump-
tion in English Households, 1600–1750. London: 
Routledge.
244     Journal of Economic Perspectives
Palma, Nuno, and Jaime Reis. 2014. 
“Portuguese Demography and Economic 
Growth, 1500–1850.” Paper for the “Accounting 
for the Great Divergence” conference at the 
University of Warwick in Venice, May 22–24, 
2014. http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/ 
economics/research/centres/cage/events/ 
conferences/greatdivergence14/portuguese 
_demography_and_economic_growth_1500 
-1850_-_may_19th_2014.pdf.
Pfister, Ulrich. 2011. “Economic Growth in 
Germany, 1500–1850.” Paper for the “Quantifying 
Long Run Economic Development” conference at 
the University of Warwick in Venice, March, 22–24, 
2011. https://www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/wisoge/
organisation/personen/pfister/forschung/
Growth-Venice-2011.pdf.
Pinkovsky, Maxim, and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 
2014. “Lights, Camera . . . Income! Estimating 
Poverty Using National Accounts, Survey Means, 
and Lights.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Staff Report 669.
Pomeranz, Kenneth. 2000. The Great Divergence: 
China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World 
Economy. Princeton University Press.
Prados de la Escosura, Leandro. 2000. “Interna-
tional Comparisons of Real Product, 1820–1990: 
An Alternative Data Set.” Explorations in Economic 
History 37(1): 1–41.
Prados de la Escosura, Leandro. 2015. 
“Mismeasuring Long-Run Growh: The Bias from 
Splicing National Accounts—The Case of Spain.” 
Cliometrica. Published online May 28.
Pritchett, Lant. 1997. “Divergence, Big Time.” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(3): 3–17.
Pritchett, Lant. 2000. “Understanding Patterns 
of Economic Growth: Searching for Hills among 
Plateaus, Mountains, and Plains.” World Bank 
Economic Review 14(2): 221–50.
Quah, Danny T. 1996. “Empirics for Economic 
Growth and Convergence.” European Economic 
Review 40(6): 1353–75.
Quah, Danny T. 1997. “Empirics for Growth 
and Distribution: Stratification, Polarization, and 
Convergence Clubs.” Journal of Economic Growth 
2(1): 27–59.
Reinert, Sophus A. 2011. Translating Empire: 
Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy. 
Harvard University Press.
Reis, Jaime, Conceição A. Martins, and Leonor 
F. Costa. 2013. “From Major Power to Economic 
Backwater: Portugal’s GDP 1500–1850.” Paper 
presented at “Accounting for the Great Diver-
gence” conference at the University of Warwick, 
May 28, 2013. http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/
soc/economics/research/centres/cage/events/
conferences/mayconf/tuesday28may/reis.pdf.
Rodrik, Dani. 1999. “Where Did All the 
Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict 
and Growth Collapses.” Journal of Economic Growth 
4(4): 385–412.
Saito, Osamu. 2015. “Growth and Inequality in 
the Great and Little Divergence Debate: A Japanese 
Perspective.” Economic History Review 68(2): 399–419.
Schön, Lennart, and Olle Krantz. 2012. “The 
Swedish Economy in the Early Modern Period: 
Constructing Historical National Accounts 
1560–2000.” European Review of Economic History 
16(4): 529–49.
Smith, Adam. 1776. The Wealth of Nations. 
London: Methuen & Co.
Solow, Robert M. 1956. “A Contribution to the 
Theory of Economic Growth.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 70(1): 65–94.
Squicciarini, Mara P., and Nico Voigtländer. 
Forthcoming. “Human Capital and Industrializa-
tion: Evidence from the Age of Enlightenment.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Thirsk, Joan. 1978. Economic Policy and Projects: 
The Development of a Consumer Society in Early 
Modern England. Clarendon Press. Oxford.
Thorold, Rogers, J. E. 1866–1902. A History of 
Agriculture and Prices in England, vols. 1–6. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Turner, Michael E., John V. Beckett, and 
Bethanie Afton. 2001. Farm Production in England 
1700–1914. Oxford University Press.
van Zanden, Jan Luiten, and Bas van Leeuwen. 
2012. “Persistent But Not Consistent: The Growth 
of National Income in Holland 1347–1807.” 
Explorations in Economic History 49(2): 119–30.
Wrigley, E. Anthony, Ros S. Davies, James E. 
Oeppen, and Roger S. Schofield. 1997. English 
Population History from Family Reconstitution, 
1580–1837. Cambridge University Press.
Wrigley, E. Anthony, and Roger S. Schofield. 
1989. The Population History of England, 1541–1871: 
A Reconstruction. Cambridge University Press.
